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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The functional approach the Court utilizes to
affirm the six-man jury is less cogent than the
historical.5' The avowed purpose of the jury in the
criminal setting is to prevent oppression by the
government. 52 The Court found that this purpose,
the essential feature of a jury lies in the inter-
position between the accused and his accuser of
the common sense judgment of a group of laymen,
and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence." 11 The
Court then concluded that the number of persons
comprising a jury does not affect its function as a
buffer between the state and the individual.
There are two difficulties with this conclusion.
For the defendant there is safety in numbers,
especially when the accused is a member of a
minority ethnic group. Moreover, when a unani-
mous verdict is necessary, a twelve-man jury would
seem far more advantageous to the defendant
than a six-man jury, inasmuch as a twelve-man
jury effectively doubles the accused's chances of
11 Id. at 100-03.
2Id. at 100. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968).
"399 U.S. at 100.
finding one sympathetic juror to 'hang" the
jury.54
Secondly, although the ideal that a man is to be
judged by a jury of his peers seldom corresponds
with reality,5 the Williams decision hardly brings
us closer to that goal. By permitting Williams to
be imprisoned for life by a jury of six, the chance
of his being judged by a representative cross-
section of his community is reduced by one-half.
The Court responded to this contention by saying
that, so long as the peremptory challenge exists,
fair representation can never really exist, even on
a twelve-man jury.56 Assuming that to be true, the
Court still fails to recognize the fact that its
decision in Williams still further exacerbates the
shortcomings of American juries.
Both issues in Williams presented the Court
with the inevitable conflict of interest between
the individual's rights and the state's interest in
efficient and expeditious justice." The affirmation
of Johnny Williams' conviction indicates the
Court's deference for the latter.
5Id. at 101 nn. 47-48.
"1 H. Jacob, JusTicE iN Aim icA 110-112 (1965).
56399 U.S. at 102.
"See notes 11 and 46 supra, and accompanying text.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970)
In recent years, the Supreme Court has ex-
panded the scope of the fifth amendment' privilege
against self-incrimination.2 This trend, however,
stalled during October Term, 1969. Illustrative
of the refusal by the Supreme Court to expand
the boundaries of the fifth amendment is United
States v. Kordel.4 This unanimous decision5 did
little more than restate established law, indicating
'The fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides in part: "No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ......
2See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso
v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1969); Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
3See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969);
United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); Bryson v.
United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
4 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
'Mr. Justice Black did not take part in the decision.
no future or potential areas of alteration in judicial
thought.
In Kordel, the Food and Drug Administration6
initiated an in rem action to seize two products
produced and distributed by Detroit Vital Foods,
Inc.' Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,' the FDA served extensive
6 Hereinafter cited as FDA.7The indictment charged the corporation "with
introduction into interstate commerce of misbranded
drugs and with causing a drug to be misbranded after
it had been shipped in interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(a) and (k) (1964)." United States v. Detroit Vital
Foods, Inc., 407 F.2d 570, 571 (6th Cir. 1969).
8 At that time, Rule 33 provided in part:
Any party may serve upon any adverse party
written interrogatories to be answered by the
party served or, if the party served is a public or
private corporation or a partnership or associa-
tion, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish
such information as is available to the party.
Rule 33 was amended on March 30, 1970, to be effec-
tive on July 1, 1970. The changes, however, do not
affect the use of Rule 33 in Kordel.
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interrogatories on the corporation in this civil
action. Before the interrogatories were answered,
the FDA served further notice on the corporation
that the FDA was contemplating the commence-
ment of criminal proceedings against the corpo-
ration and its officers. 9 The criminal action was
to be grounded upon the same transactions that
that were at issue in the civil action.
The corporation moved to stay further pro-
ceedings in the civil action or to allow the inter-
rogatories to go unanswered until any future
criminal action was taken.
The corporation claimed that:
[p]ernitting the Government to obtain proof of
violations of the Act by resort to civil discovery
procedures... would be 'improper' and would
'work a grave injustice against the claimant';
it would also enable the Government to have pre-
trial discovery of the ... defense to future criminal
charges. 0
The officers, moreover, never expressly claimed
that their privilege against self-incrimination
was being denied.
The corporation's motion was denied by the
district court, and the interrogatories were
ordered to be answered. Before the corporation's
vice president answered the interrogatories, the
FDA decided to proceed with the previously
contemplated criminal prosecution. With the aid
of the interrogatories, the corporation and its
president and vice president were convicted on
the criminal charges.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the convictions of the president and
vice president on the ground that the Govern-
ment's use of interrogatories to obtain evidence
from the officers in a nearly contemporaneous
civil proceeding violated their fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."
It was felt that the officers' actions were not vol-
untary in light of the three alternatives available
to them. If they had refused to answer the inter-
9The Federal Food, Drug, 'and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 335 (1964), provides:
Before any violation of [the Act] ... is reported by
the Secretary [of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and NWelfare] to any United States attorney
for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person
against whom such proceeding is contemplated
shall be given appropriate notice and an oppor-
tunity to present his views, either orally or in
writing, with regard to such contemplated proceed-
ing.
10 397 U.S. at 5.
21407 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1969).
rogatories despite the district court order, their
seized property would have been forfeited. If they
had falsified their answers, they would have run the
risk of a prosecution for perjury. If they supplied
the required information, as they did, they would
incriminate themselves in the potential criminal
action.
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart,
the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and upheld the convictions. The Court reasoned
that the vice president need not have answered
the interrogatories if he had actually invoked his
fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. Stewart said that "[the vice
president's] failure at any time to assert the
constitutional privilege leaves him in no position
to complain now that he was compelled to give
testimony against himself.""12 There is ample
precedent for the principle that the privilege is
deemed waived unless invoked.13 Describing the
element of compulsion which is prohibited by
the fifth amendment, the Sixth Circuit had stated
that "[a] person may not be required to supply
information which may possibly incriminate him
upon penalty of suffering a forfeiture of his prop-
erty." 14 While this is good law, the vice president
was never required to answer the interrogatories;
all he had to do was assert his privilege.1
The facts in Kordel, however, raise the question
of whether the Court should have inferred that
the witness was attempting to invoke the privilege,
even though he did not affirmatively request that
his fifth amendment rights be protected. The
decision itself does not allude to this matter. The
Supreme Court has stated that the waiver of
constitutional rights, which includes the privilege
against self-incrimination, is "not lightly to be
inferred." 16 It has also been stated that "[the
privilege may not be relied on and must be deemed
waived if not in sone manner fairly brought to the
attention of the tribunal which must pass on it." 17
1 397 U.S. at 10.
13 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951);
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943);
Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 525-26 (9th
Cir. 1969).
14 407 F.2d at 573.
15 The Court also noted that the president of the cor-
poration had a very tenuous self-incrimination argu-
ment. He had neither asserted the privilege nor an-
swered any of the interrogatories. The president had
"attempted to fashion a self-incrimination claim by
combining testimony that he never gave and an asser-
tion of the privilege that he never made .... " 397 U.S.
at 10.
"6 Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949).
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No special combination of words is required to
invoke the privilege; all that is necessary is an
objection stated in language that the tribunal may
reasonably be expected to understand as an at-
tempt to claim the privilege' 8 While the tribunal
is not obligated to either accept or reject the
ambiguous constitutional claim the very moment
it is first presented, there is an obligation to in-
quire into the nature of the claim or to ask whether
the witness is in fact invoking the privilege. 9
In Kordel, there was a motion to either stay
further civil proceedings or extend the date when
the answers were due, and it was claimed that the
use of the interrogatories would serve injustice
and inform the Government of the defenses to
future criminal charges. The Supreme Court
apparently felt that the waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination could be justifiably
inferred since the privilege was neither asserted
nor "in some manner fairly brought" to the trial
court's attention.'0  Strictly interpreted, the
respondent's motions to stay or extend the answer
date or his other claims did not reasonably indicate
to the court the desire to invoke the privilege.
Moreover, they did not allude to the prospect
that his answering the interrogatories might
actually lead to his future criminal conviction.
They did, however, manifest a fear of divulging
criminal defenses.
It is difficult for a judge to always sense when
the threshold of self-incrimination is approaching.
This, in turn, makes it difficult for a judge to
inform the witness of his privilege to remain silent
before the incrimination occurs." In Kordel, how-
ever, the trial court could reasonably have ap-
prehended the possibility for self-incrimination
which later occurred. The motions and claims did,
at the least, indicate a desire not to answer the
17 United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) (emphasis
added).
18 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162-63
(1955); 8 J. WIGmoR, Evin.NcE § 2268, at 402
(McNaughton ed. 1961).
19 349 U.S. at 164; Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190, 194-95 (1955).
20 Compare Kordel v. United States, 397 U.S. 1
(1970), with Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137
(1949). In Smith, the Supreme Court characterized a
witness' statement "I want to claim privilege as to any-
thing I say" as a "definite claim of general privilege
against self-incrimination." Id. at 151. See also Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
2l Perhaps the best solution is to inform the witness
of the privilege before any testimony is given or inter-
rogatories are answered.
interrogatories. The court, having had contact
with the interrogatories, must have recognized
their self-incriminating tendency." The court
perhaps should have realized that what the vice
president had in mind, but failed to properly
place into words, might be fear of self-incrimination.
This being the case, the court could reasonably
have inquired into the nature of the vice president's
claim to determine exactly what the motivation
behind it was.
It is possible, however, that when the witness
is represented by counsel notice of the privilege
against self-incrimination need not be communi-
cated by the court.23 The opinion in Kordel stated
that the vice president was neither unrepresented
by counsel nor without an appreciation of the
possible consequences when he answered the
"2407 F.2d at 575:
[T]he interrogatories submitted by the Government
were broader than would ordinarily be needed
in a civil case. Some of the interrogatories were
directed specifically toward the activities of [the
president].
"8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2269, at 412-13
(McNaughton ed. 1961) states:
Should the judge, or other presiding official, warn
the witness, when an incriminating fact is inquired
about, that he has by law an option to refuse an
answer? At one time, such a course was often in-
sisted upon by the leaders at the bar; and it is plain
that the old practice was to give such a warning
when it appeared to be needed. But, as general
knowledge spread among the masses and the prepa-
ration for testimony became more thorough, this
practice seems to have disappeared in England, so
far at least as any general rule was concerned.
In the United States both the rule and the trial
custom vary in the different jurisdictions. No
doubt a capable and painstaking judge will give
the warning where need appears, but there is no
reason for letting a wholesome custom generate
into a technical rule. (footnotes omitted).
An earlier edition contained the following in regard to
the witness being warned when an incriminating fact is
inquired about:
In the first place, such a warning would be an
anomaly; it is not given for any other privilege;
witnesses are in other respects supposed to know
their rights; and why not here? ... Finally, in
practical convenience, there is no demand for such
a rule; witnesses are usually well enough advised
beforehand by counsel as to their rights when such
issues impend, and judges are too much concerned
with other responsibilities to be burdened with the
prevision of individual witnesses' knowledge; the
risk of their being in ignorance should fall rather
upon the party summoning than the party oppos-
ing.
Id. § 2269, at 398-99 (3d ed. 1940). See State v. Lucas,
24 Conn. Supp. 353, 190 A.2d 511 (1963), for the view
that where a state's case rests solidly on the testimony
of a defendant who is not represented by counsel, and no
prima fade case has been made out when the defendant




interrogatories.24 This being the case, the trial
court would ordinarily be under no obligation to
notify him of his privilege.2 s
A dilemma is raised while trying to ascertain
what the trial court's action should have been.
Which factor should take preference, the fact that
the court was aware of a possible claim of privilege,
or the fact that the witness was represented by
counsel? If the former, the court would be obligated
to inquire further and perhaps warn the vice presi-
dent of his right. If the latter, the court would be
under no such obligation. The optimum approach
would be to disregard the existence of counsel and
inquire as to the witness' motives for objection.
If self-incrimination was indeed its basis, then
the court would correctly interpret the ambiguous
or vague language and justice would be served.
If self-incrimination had nothing to do with the
refusal to testify, no harm would be done, and the
witness could be ordered to answer.
Moreover, the fact than an individual is repre-
sented by counsel by no means insures that he
will be adequately protected. There is the chance
that due to incompetence or bad judgment counsel
may not appropriately react to inquiries directed
to his client. The attorney also may not be ade-
quately familiar with his client, nor understand
what testimony might lead to potentially detri-
mental results. Such is often the plight of the
public defender who represents an indigent.
There is often a minimum amount of time available
for consultation with the multitude of defendants
he is assigned to.
In upholding the convictions, the Court stated
that an individual is not barred from relying on
the privilege against self-incrimination simply
because the information is sought in a civil pro-
ceeding and not in a criminal proceeding. 8 This
reaffirmation of the law is of current importance
in light of the increased frequency of concurrent
civil and criminal actions arising out of the same
24 397 U.S. at 9-10.
25 The Supreme Court recently stated in Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968), that "[t]he privi-
lege may be waived in appropriate circumstances if the
waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made." It should
be noted that when the witness is represented by
counsel, it is often counsel who "knowingly and volun-
tarily" waives the witness' privilege. Thus, the witness
may sometimes suffer due to the bad judgment or im-
competence of counsel. It would appear that this is
what occurred in Kordel.
26 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886); C.
McCoRcmr, EviDENcE § 123, at 259 (1954).
activity.27 In these instances, the civil litigant
should not be compelled to submit to incriminating
civil discovery which will be used in the con-
current or subsequent criminal action without
adequate safeguards.
The decision also dealt with other varied aspects
of the privilege against self-incrimination, but its
dicta were based on well settled law. A corporation
cannot assert the privilege; it is a personal priv-
ilege.29 Being individuals, the officials of a corpo-
ration can assert the privilege. However, it must
be asserted on their own behalf, and not to protect
another party, such as a corporation."0 Service
of the interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 obligates
the corporation to appoint an officer or agent to
supply the necessary information. This obligation
cannot be satisfied by appointing an individual
who would then invoke his own constitutional
privilege.n If such an officer or agent could be
appointed, the ultimate effect would be to "rper-
mit the corporation to assert on its own behalf
the personal privilege of its individual agents." 2
27 In the area of antitrust law, the criminal statutes
are addressed to the same kind of illegal activities as
are the provisions for private civil actions. See, e.g.,
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
28 Criminal discovery itself is limited and usually a
matter of discretion with the trial court rather than a
matter of right. The use of civil discovery methods has
become of great importance in obtaining information
for criminal prosecutions. See Norton, Discovery in the
Criminal .Process, 61 J. Cne. L.C. &. P.S. 11 (1970).
29 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99
(1944).
10 id. at 700:
The reason underlying the restriction of this con-
stitutional privilege to natural individuals acting
in their own private capacity is clear. The scope
and nature of the economic activities of incor-
porated and unincorporated organizations and
their representatives demand that the constitu-
tional power of the federal and state governments
to regulate those activities be correspondingly
effective. The greater portion of evidence of wrong-
doing by an organization or its representatives is
usually to be found in the official records and docu-
ments of the organization. Were the cloak of the
privilege to be thrown around these impersonal
records and documents, effective enforcement of
many federal and state laws would be impossible.
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). The vice
president in Kordel could have invoked the privilege
since he was not being asked to submit the corporate
records and documents, but rather answers to interroga-
tories. These answers could possibly be more aptly
described as either testimony or private papers, either
of which may allow him to invoke the privilege. See
generally Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122
(1957); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699
(1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-86
1911); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
31United States v. 3963 Bottles ... of.. . Enerjol
Double Strength, 265 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1959).
32 397 U.S. at 8.
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